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Abstract 
The containment of health care expenditure is one of the major challenges facing public 
policymakers in the developed countries. This paper provides evidence of significant 
differences in the cross-country level of efficiency of health care expenditure, meaning that 
potential cost savings for the countries considered least efficient might be very high. 
Further, a significant relationship is found between the various health care policies and 
institutions in the OECD countries and the efficiency levels of health care systems. The 
findings are, however, highly sensitive to the efficiency-estimation methodology used. 
Keywords: Health care expenditure, efficiency. 
JEL Classification: I12, I18, H51. 
Resumen 
La contención del gasto sanitario es uno de los retos más importante a los que se enfrentan 
las políticas públicas de los países desarrollados. En este trabajo se muestra evidencia de que 
existen diferencias significativas en el nivel de eficiencia del gasto sanitario entre países, de 
forma que los ahorros potenciales de coste para los considerados menos eficientes podrían 
ser elevados. Además, se encuentra una relación significativa entre distintas políticas e 
instituciones sanitarias en los países de la OCDE y los niveles de eficiencia de los sistemas 
sanitarios. Los resultados son, sin embargo, sensibles a la metodología de estimación de la 
eficiencia utilizada. 
Palabras claves: Gasto sanitario, eficiencia. 
Códigos JEL: I12, I18, H51. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent decades health-care expenditure has grown very significantly in most developed 
countries, from 6% of GDP in 1970 to around 12% of GDP in 2007. Many factors are behind 
this trend, including a demand for health care services that increases with income and supply 
factors, related, for example, with the impact of technological change (IMF, 2010). This trend 
might hold in the future or even become more pronounced, due among other reasons to the 
phenomenon of population ageing (see Oliveira et al., 2006). The control of health care 
expenditure or its financing are therefore priority aspects of the design of public policies. This 
priority has increased in recent years given the need to ensure the success of the fiscal 
consolidation processes in which most economies are immersed, following the surge in 
budget deficits and public debt during the economic crisis. 
Among the various economic policy options here, those geared to attaining higher 
levels of efficiency in the provision of health services are particularly appropriate, and less 
politically controversial. This is because, by definition, they would contribute to containing 
public spending (using fewer resources) while maintaining the same output and quality of 
the services. 
The alternatives that may give rise to improved efficiency in the provision of 
healthcare services are potentially very diverse. Among them, the existing literature 
emphasizes the role played by health policies and institutions, including aspects such as the 
degree of public coverage, its financing, the public or private nature of the provision of health-
care services or the administrative or territorial organisation of the system. 
This paper analyses the role of health care policies and institutions.  Specifically, use 
is made of the database constructed by Paris et al. (2010), which encapsulates in a series of 
indicators information on the health-care policies and institutions in 29 OECD countries. On 
the basis of these indicators and of the health-care efficiency indices estimated by the OECD 
(2010), the impact of health care policies on efficiency is empirically estimated. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the determinants of 
the growth of health care expenditure in recent years along with the estimates available as to 
its future trend. Section 3 presents health-care efficiency indices for 29 OECD countries and 
analyses the potential savings that might be had through gains in efficiency. Given that there 
is high dispersion in the existing literature regarding the measures of the efficiency of health 
care expenditure, the findings are presented considering two alternative efficiency indices. 
Section 4 briefly summarises the existing literature on the effectiveness of different policies on 
health-care efficiency; it sets out the 20 indicators that summarise the characteristics of 
national health care systems and the empirical evidence on the relationship between public 
policies and the efficiency of health care systems. Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
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2 Determinants of health care expenditure and estimates of its long-term trend 
The economic literature highlights a series of determinants of health care expenditure. First, 
there are some factors linked to demographics. Specifically, there is evidence that health care 
expenditure increases with age (see chart 1), meaning that a change in the age structure of 
the population will also give rise to a change in overall health care expenditure. In particular, a 
rise in the dependency ratio brought on by an increase in life expectancy will lead pressure to 
be exerted on health spending, even if it is assumed that spending per person for the different 
age cohorts holds constant. 
Nonetheless, per capita health care expenditure may also be affected by 
demographics. On one hand, an increase in life expectancy may translate into improved 
quality of life for the elderly, entailing lower per capita spending for these cohorts. On the 
other, the empirical evidence available shows that the highest health care costs over the life of 
an individual are concentrated in the final years of life (see, for example, Seshamani and Gray, 
2004). Given that an increasing life expectancy means that the mortality rates for each age 
group diminished, that would give rise to a decline in the average costs for the related age 
group (Zwiefel et al., 1999). 
As regards non-demographic factors, the literature stresses that technology and 
other supply and demand side factors would also have played a most significant role 
when explaining increases in health care expenditure in the past (Getzen, 2000). Specifically, 
it is argued that technological progress increases the variety and quality of healthcare 
products and treatment, which occasionally prove more costly. Moreover, even in those 
cases in which technological progress generates cost reductions, the associated decline in 
relative prices might prompt increases in expenditure given the high price elasticity of the 
demand for health care services1. 
Precisely to analyse the factors behind the growth of public health care expenditure 
in per capita terms, such expenditure can be decomposed into three groups of factors: 
demographic, those arising from the increase in per capita income and, lastly, a residual 
factor that would encompass supply-side factors such as changes in the cost and price of 
treatments (see Oliveira et al., 2006). This decomposition can be expressed as follows: 
 
where the variable fdem represents the contribution of the demographic factor. The second 
component seeks to reflect the impact of growth in real per capita income. The variable 
nodem is a residual that would reflect supply-side factors and other non-demographic 
factors. 
Chart 2 shows the growth of per capita health care expenditure in various OECD 
countries between June 1980 and 2008, and the contribution of the foregoing factors to this 
                                                                          
1. For example, Dormont and Huber (2005) find that the decline in the price of certain surgical procedures in France has 
meant that their frequency increases significantly. 
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growth, under the assumption that both the demographic factor and that relating to per 
capita income have unit elasticity. This decomposition uses as a demographic factor the 
difference between per capita health care expenditure with the 1980 population age structure 
and per capita health expenditure under the 2008 age structure. Specifically, we calculate per 
capita health care expenditure as a weighted average of the per capita expenditure for each 
age group using as weights the population proportions in each age group in 1980 and 
in 2008. The difference between both per capita expenditures proxies the change in health 
care spending derived from population ageing. According to this information, a significant 
portion of the approximately 6% annual growth in per capita health care expenditure in 
the OECD countries during the period was due to the increase in per capita income (with the 
contribution of 52%) and in the residual factors (44%), whereas the contribution of the 
demographic factor was limited2.Spain shows a similar decomposition in the growth of health 
care expenditure to the OECD average3. 
These decompositions can also be used to make long-term projections of per capita 
health care spending. This is particularly significant in a context such as the present in which, 
according to the estimates available, progressive population ageing is expected in the 
developed countries. That will raise dependency ratios considerably which, based on the 
foregoing arguments, would tend to increase health care expenditure. Conversely, improved 
quality of life among the elderly or the reduction in mortality rates for each age group 
associated with the increase in life expectancy might prompt a fall in the average health care 
costs for the various age groups. Lastly, long-term estimates should take into account the 
role of non-demographic factors which, as indicated, appear to have had more of a bearing 
on the growth of health care spending observed in the past than purely demographic factors. 
Such long-run estimates are made, for instance, in the European Commission’s 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) reports (see EC, 2009)4.On the latest EC estimates, health 
care spending as a percentage of GDP would increase in the European Union by between 0.7 
and 2.4 pp between 2007 and 2060 (between 1 and 2.6 pp of GDP in Spain). In its central 
scenario, the increase in spending as a percentage of GDP is 1.5 pp in the EU in 1.6 pp in 
Spain (see table 1), under the assumption that the profile of health spending by age group 
estimated at the initial moment of the projection holds, that an income elasticity of health care 
spending equal to 1.1 in 2007 converging in a linear fashion to 1 in 2060 is assumed, and 
that an improvement in the health status of the population is incorporated so that sickness 
rates are reduced to half of what mortality rates are, which is equivalent to shifting the curve 
representing per capita health care spending by age bracket in Chart 1 rightwards5. 
The OECD’s health care spending projections (see Oliveira et al, 2006) broadly show 
higher increases in spending on this item than those in the EPC report. Specifically, an 
increase in health care spending of between 2.0 and 3.9 pp of GDP between 2005 and 2050 
                                                                          
2. Very similar results are obtained when calculating the same decomposition but on the basis of elasticities of the 
demographic factors and of per capita income estimated drawing on the overall data available for all countries. 
Specifically, according to these estimates the demographic factor shows and elasticity of 1.8 relative to per capita 
expenditure, while the elasticity of per capita income is 1.2. In this case, the contributions of these two factors to health 
care expenditure growth increase slightly but the previous conclusions hold. In addition, the same results are also 
obtained using the change in life expectancy (instead of the change in the population age structure) as a proxy of the 
demographic factor. 
3. These results are similar to those of the previous literature (for a summary of this literature, see, for example, Casado 
et al. 2009).  
4. See Casado et al. (2009) for a review of other papers with particular reference to Spain. 
5. Moreover, the estimates are based on Eurostat 2008 projections (Europop 2008), and on macroeconomic 
assumptions regarding changes in the rates of participation, unemployment and productivity common to all the countries 
(see EC, 2009). 
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on average in the OECD (2.3 and 4.1 pp of GDP in Spain) is estimated, depending on the 
scenario considered6. In relation to demographic factors, a distinction is made in the 
simulations between average per capita spending by age group of surviving individuals and 
per capita spending associated with age group deaths for individuals who pass away, which 
in both cases hold constant over the projection horizon. In any event, demographic factors 
generate a small effect on health care spending relative to GDP, of around 0.6% on average 
(0.9% in Spain). As to non-demographic factors, the OECD considers two scenarios. First, 
the pressure-on-costs scenario (pessimistic), in which it is assumed that expenditure growth 
per annum exceeds the related growth in income by 1%, which is equivalent to observations 
in the past two decades and which would give rise to an additional increase in health care 
spending of around 3 pp of GDP, on average. And second, the cost-containment scenario 
(optimistic), in which the adoption of measures to eliminate this extra spending over the 
course of the projection period is assumed, which would restrict the additional increase in 
spending by approximately half. 
Finally, the IMF (2010) estimates the average increase in health care spending 
projected to 2050 at around 3 pp of GDP, with an increase of 5 pp in the case of the United 
States and 2 pp in Europe (1.6 pp in Spain). In this case, the projections are based on the 
assumption that the health care spending profile by age group estimated at the outset of the 
projection will hold, and an improvement in the health status of the population is incorporated 
such that sickness rates fall at half the pace death rates do, as in the case of the European 
Commission’s projections. Moreover, included for each country is the effect estimated in the 
past of what is known as “excess cost growth”, which is defined as the excess growth of per 
capita health care spending relative to per capita GDP growth once the demographic effect is 
controlled for. As a result, around one-third of the estimated increase in health care spending 
will be attributable to population ageing and the rest to non-demographic factors derived from 
income growth, technological progress and health care policies and regulations. 
Table 1 offers a summary of the projections made by different agencies. Overall, all 
the papers may be said to augur a significant increase in the future. Further, although future 
increases in health care spending due to population ageing will be significant and 
unavoidable, the impact of supply-side and non-demographic factors might be even greater. 
                                                                          
6. In this case the population projections are based on national sources (National statistics institutes), while the 
assumptions about participation rates were taken from prior OECD papers which basically reflected the impact of cohort 
effects (Burniaux et al., 2003). Finally, labour productivity growth is assumed to converge in a linear fashion from its initial 
observed rate in all the countries (see Oliveira et al., 2006). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1107 
3 Efficiency of health care systems and potential expenditure savings 
Given past developments and in keeping with the content of the previous section the 
foreseeable future course of health care expenditure, it is well worth analysing which factors 
might allow its growth trend to be broken. The first approach to this question can be made by 
comparing the degree of efficiency in the cross-country production of health-care services, 
which illustrates the headroom for reducing costs without this affecting health care output. 
Measurement of productive efficiency is based on the relationship between output 
produced and inputs required for production. This measurement is not free from difficulties. 
In the particular case of health care efficiency, despite even the definition of output is not 
exempt from controversies7, the literature on the efficiency of national health systems 
appears to have reached a consensus on life expectancy8 as the main output in the health 
care production function. 
On the other hand, two alternative approaches have been considered in the 
literature for estimating efficiency indices: data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). DEA is deterministic and non-parametric, i.e. as it is non-parametric 
it need not assume any functional form for the production frontier; however, as it is 
deterministic, any deviation between the actual production and the frontier is classified as 
inefficiency without any possibility of randomness. Conversely, SFA is parametric and 
stochastic. That is to say, using SFA it is necessary to assume a specific functional form for 
the production frontier, but at the same time we can include a source of randomness in 
production. The literature that compares both approaches is very extensive but relatively 
inconclusive regarding the preferred alternative [see, for example, Gong and Sickles (1992), 
Bjurek et al. (1990), Hjalmarsson et al. (1996)]. Moreover, efficiency estimates crucially 
depend on the methodology used. For instance, using data compiled by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2000), Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003) estimate DEA indices of 
health care efficiency for 191 countries while Greene (2004) estimates SFA indices, and the 
results are significantly different. Also in the sphere of health care efficiency, Chirikos and 
Sear (2000) and Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003) confirmed that the efficiency rankings 
resulting from both approaches applied to the same data usually differ considerably, hence 
the importance of their comparison and the relevance of presenting the results in 
accordance with both alternatives. 
All in all, in this paper we choose to carry out all the exercises considering both 
approaches separately. More concretely, Section 3.1 presents the health care efficiency 
indices obtained through non-parametric techniques (DEA) in OECD (2010). In Section 3.2 we 
estimate and discuss efficiency indices based on the stochastic frontier approach, and, finally, 
in Section 3.3 we analyze the potential monetary savings resulting from efficiency gains 
(measured according to both DEA and SFA approaches). 
 
                                                                          
7. Moreover, the efficiency measures used in the literature may refer to different levels of the health care system. 
Generally, a distinction is made between those papers that measure gains in health status for each type of illness across 
the various sub-sectors of the health care system (hospitals, chemist’s, etc.) or the health care system as a whole (see 
Häkkinen and Joumard, 2007, for a discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of these three approaches). 
8. Generally, disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) is used. See WHO (2000). 
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3.1 Efficiency measures based on non-parametric techniques (DEA). 
As earlier mentioned, DEA relates output (measured by life expectancy) to inputs (health care 
and the socioeconomic characteristics of the population, essentially). More specifically, DEA 
analysis conducted by the OECD (2010) for a group of 29 countries in 2007 is based on 
defining a frontier of production of life expectancy (a measure of the health system’s output) 
using a series of resources such as per capita health care expenditure, the level of per capita 
income and the level of educational attainment of the population, and the lifestyle 
characteristics of each country (i.e. the inputs the national health system disposes of to 
“produce” life expectancy). Taking the production frontier estimated through non-parametric 
techniques, the country will be efficient if it stands on this frontier, i.e. if it cannot produce 
more output without using more inputs9. Accordingly, the efficient country will have a unit 
efficiency index and the other countries will have efficiency levels that are always below unity 
and calculated on the basis of their distance from the production frontier on which the most 
efficient country stands (Farrell, 1957). 
The upper panel of Chart 3 shows the DEA efficiency indices estimated by the OECD 
(2010) for 29 countries. According to these estimates, Australia is the most efficient country of 
the sample and therefore obtained a unit efficiency index. In Spain’s case, high levels 
of relative efficiency in health care output are observed, although there is some room for 
improvement when compared with the most efficient countries. Specifically, the efficient 
frontier stands at 1.5% above that of Spain, the interpretation of which may be that if Spain 
used its resources optimally in the health care output process, it might obtain greater life 
expectancy given the resources it currently consumes. Alternatively, if Spain were to use its 
health care resources more efficiently, it could “produce” the same life expectancy with fewer 
resources, specifically with lower health care expenditure. 
3.2 Efficiency measures based on stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
As previously indicated, data envelopment analysis is based on the non-parametric estimation 
of the production frontier using linear programming methods. With a given level of inputs, any 
deviation between actual output and the frontier is considered inefficiency. Alternatively, we 
now present the basics of the SFA approach and estimate efficiency indicators for national 
health care systems based on this stochastic technique. Under this methodology the output 
frontier is estimated assuming a specific functional form and distinguishing between two 
components in the error term, one due to inefficiency (always zero or positive) and another 
due to randomness. The inefficiency term captures unobservable characteristics which 
systematically make production to lie below its potential level (this term is zero for the efficient 
unit which lies in the frontier). 
Specifically, we consider the following parametric production function: 
 
where itY  represents life expectancy as an output of the health care system in country i  
in year t . This output arises from inputs included in the vector itX  and which include 
socio-economic factors such as the level of educational attainment, per capita income 
and pollution, lifestyle characteristics such as fruit and alcohol consumption and, lastly, 
                                                                          
9. The efficient country will be that which has the higher life expectancy given certain inputs.  This may arise because life 
expectancy is higher for the same given level of expenditure, or because for the same life expectancy, there is a lower 
level of expenditure or of other inputs.  
iititit uvXY   '
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each country’s health care expenditure10. Namely, the inputs considered in our estimates 
are the same as those used by the OECD (2010) in the estimation of the DEA index set 
out in the previous section11. Finally, itv represents sources of random change in the 
model and 0iu  is a non-negative random variable that represents the specific 
inefficiency of each country. 
For estimation purposes, the model can be rewritten as: 
 
where now ii u . Schmidt and Sickles (1984) propose estimating this equation 
using a fixed-effects estimator due to the possible correlation between the inefficiency and 
the inputs. In this framework, the country with the biggest estimated fix defects is considered 
the most efficient country, and that which therefore defines the production frontier 
( )ˆmax(~ i  ). To calculate the inefficiencies of each country relative to the benchmark, 
ensuring in turn that they are all positive, we estimate: 
 
We can thus define the stochastic efficiency index as follows12: 
 
 
Using a panel of 29 OECD countries with annual observations between 1997 
and 2009, we estimate the SFA health care efficiency index presented in the lower panel of 
Chart 3. As was to be expected, the country ranking for health care efficiency differs 
depending on whether we use the SFA or DEA approach; specifically, the correlation between 
both indices is 0.4 and significant at the 5% level. According to the SFA index, the most 
efficient country in health care output is Japan (which was in fourth place according to the 
DEA index) while Spain is seventh (according to the DEA index it was in twelfth position). 
3.3 Potential expenditure savings from efficiency improvements 
Given the observed differences in health system management efficiency levels across 
countries, one can argue that if a given country combines its resources efficiently, it could 
“produce” the same output (i.e. the same life expectancy) with fewer resources, in particular, 
with lower health expenditures. 
With the aim of quantifying this potential saving in monetary terms, we consider the 
following equation relating life expectancy to expenditure and health care efficiency:  
                                                                          
10. Note that dummy variables are also included for each year, reducing the potential correlation between each 
country’s error terms.  This is a vital prerequisite for the consistency of the estimates. 
11. In fact, the OECD (2010) also performs very similar panel regressions to that considered in this paper. However, it 
does not calculate SFA efficiency indices in the proper sense of the term; it rather uses estimated residuals as proxies of 
efficiency. 
12. Readers interested in more details can consult Coelli et al. (2005), which is an excellent reference for the different 
methods for estimating efficiency indices and which places particular emphasis on the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
and data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
),0~|(
),~|(
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ititiit vXY   '
iiu  ˆ~~ 
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where iEV  is the life expectancy of country i in 2007, iEF  is that country’s level of health 
care efficiency, iGS  per capita health care spending and iX  is a vector with other socio-
economic characteristics that may affect a country’s life expectancy and which are habitually 
used in the literature, such as per capita income, the level of educational attainment and 
tobacco and alcohol consumption. The equation in question is estimated using data for 
29 OECD countries. 
The estimated coefficients for the level of efficiency and per capita health care 
expenditure are both positive and significant (t-ratios of 5.89 and 4.51, respectively). That is to 
say, both a higher level of efficiency and a higher level of health care expenditure would 
increase life expectancy, as might be expected. However, the estimated elasticity for the level 
of efficiency is 0.71 against the elasticity of 0.06 estimated for per capita health care 
expenditure. This means that an increase of 1% in health care efficiency would translate into 
an improvement in life expectancy of 0.71% compared with an improvement of 0.06% that 
would result from increasing health care expenditure by 1%13. 
Subsequently, the following counterfactual exercise is performed: given the 
estimated parameters that relate life expectancy to efficiency and health care expenditure 
( 1ˆ and 2ˆ ), the per capita health care expenditure ( *iGS ) that would be compatible with 
the ith country maintaining its life expectancy constant ( iEV ) is calculated, but situating the 
level of efficiency at its maximum (
MAXEF ), this latter variable corresponding to the most 
efficient. That is to say: 
 
 
Once the health care expenditure needed to hold life expectancy constant but 
assuming the maximum level of efficiency of the sample has been calculated, we can 
obtain the potential saving in country i’s health care expenditure (
*
iAP ) as a percentage of 
GDP if the maximum level of efficiency is attained in the following way:  
 
 
where iPIBpc  is the per capita GDP for country i. 
The upper panel of Chart 4 shows the potential savings for the countries of the 
sample obtained on the basis of this methodology considering the DEA efficiency index. 
By definition, Australia, the most efficient country in the sample, would have no intentional 
saving since it is already situated on the frontier. The estimated margin of saving on health 
                                                                          
13. For example, life expectancy in Spain in 2007 was 81.1 years of age, meaning that if the efficiency of the Spanish 
health care system improved by 1%, life expectancy could, maintaining health care expenditure constant, rise to 81.7 
years of age. 
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care expenditure for the OECD countries on average is 2.6% of GDP and 1.6% in Spain’s 
case, which, given the forward-looking health care expenditure projections described in the 
previous section, may be considered a significant potential saving. 
In the lower panel of Chart 4, we present the potential savings emerging from the 
approach when the SFA efficiency index is considered. In this case, the average potential 
saving for OECD countries is 2.5% of GDP and 1.2% for the Spanish case. Therefore, the 
magnitude of the potential savings in terms of health expenditure reductions (due to efficiency 
improvements) is high and very similar according to both efficiency indices. 
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4 The role of policies and institutions in improving the efficiency of health 
care systems 
In view of the potential savings that may be inferred from an improvement in the efficiency of 
health care systems, the next step is to analyse how to achieve this improved efficiency, and 
in particular what role health care policies and institutions can play. To this end, in Section 4.1 
we present an overview of the main institutional factors considered in the literature as 
determinants of health care efficiency. Later, in Section 4.2 we estimate the impact of these 
potential determinants on health care efficiency. In particular we rely on a database compiled 
by Paris et al. (2010) which covers different characteristics of health care policies and 
institutions across 29 OECD countries. Lastly, in Section 4.3 we check the robustness of our 
findings considering model averaging techniques. 
4.1 Institutions and health care efficiency 
Differences in health care systems in developed countries are quite substantial and cover 
aspects such as the degree of coverage, form of financing, public or private nature of the 
provision of services, or the administrative and territorial organization of the system. Some of 
these aspects have been identified in the literature as potential determinants of efficiency. In 
fact, many of the reforms implemented in recent years in health care systems in order to 
reduce the pressure on health related expenditures have been based on modifying some of 
these issues (IMF, 2010). 
With respect to the demand for health services, reforms have tended to increase the 
participation of patients in the coverage of health care costs, with the primary objective of 
avoiding excessive consumption of certain services. In this respect, the evidence available is 
abundant14. From a theoretical standpoint, price signals on users (or co-payment) understood 
as a system of user co-participation in the cost of the service introduces a price mechanism 
that may help allow the demand for health care services to be rationalised. As regards the 
empirical evidence, most studies show that use diminishes when user co-participation 
increases in the cost of the health care service. Specifically, the Rand Corporation conducted 
an experimental study on this in the United States. In 1975, 2,756 families from different US 
regions were randomly assigned to 5 medical insurance plans with different levels of price 
signals on users. In subsequent years (to 1982) the state of health of and use of the health 
care system by all these families was monitored in order to analyse the differences arising as 
a result of the different degree of co-payment15. The main conclusions of the study were: 
(i) a higher level of co-payment significantly reduces health care expenditure; (ii) this reduction 
is similar for all health care services (appointments with consultants, drugs…); (iii) no negative 
effects on the health of the average citizen are observed; (iv) for poorer or initially unhealthier 
citizens negative effects are observed (see Newhouse et al. 1993 for more details). 
In the case of Spain, co-payment is only currently present in the prescription of 
drugs. Specifically, National Health System (NHS) workers pay 40% of the price of drugs, 
while retirees are fully exempt16. In this respect, Tur-Prats et al. (2011) attribute the increase 
of 40% in pharmaceuticals consumption to the exemption from co-payment of retirees 
                                                                          
14. See Puig Junoy (2001) for a review of this literature. 
15. The fact that the allocation of the families to different medical insurance plans with different levels of co-payments 
was totally random ensures that the differences in the use of the health-care system and in their state of health may be 
attributed to co-payment. 
16. Within the group of workers, co-payment is only 10% for drugs treating chronic illnesses. 
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precisely at the time of their retirement (when the shift in the level of co-payment is from 40% 
to 0%). Further, they estimate price elasticities in pharmaceutical consumption of 
approximately -0.2, in line with the estimated elasticities for the United States in the Rand 
Corporation experiment17. 
Some countries have also chosen to introduce price control devices both for the 
inputs and the output, ranging from wage controls of health professionals to reference prices 
of pharmaceutical products and price controls for specific treatments. Regarding the 
regulation of prices billed by doctors and hospitals, from a theoretical point of view, it is often 
argued that greater price regulation may give rise to a substitution effect, i.e. if the prices set 
are very low, the treatment of patients becomes less lucrative, meaning that the number 
of consultations would fall. However, an income effect might also be generated, i.e. doctors 
attend more patients to offset the loss of income caused by low prices. Grytten et al. (2008) 
find that the income effect is small, whereby greater price regulation might reduce the number 
of unnecessary consultations. On the other hand, there also exist different mechanisms of 
wage determination with different potential effects on efficiency. For instance, the systems 
that set a fixed amount per visit or service can generate incentives for providers to fully satisfy 
the demand, although, again, they also have the risk of generating an induced demand from 
the supply side (Shafrin, 2010). 
As for the regulation of drug prices, the literature shows that it is not always effective 
in reducing spending, especially in the medium and long term (Moreno-Torres et al., 2010; 
Sood et al., 2009)18. In general, the literature emphasizes that reference prices for drugs may 
be more effective if a series of conditions are met. More specifically it is vital that 
the excessive drug spending is due to high prices and not to excessive prescriptions, that 
there are substantive differences between the prices of different equivalent drugs and that 
the generic drugs market is sufficiently developed (López Casasnovas and Puig Junoy, 2000). 
On the other hand, some reforms have been aimed at incorporating market 
mechanisms into the health sector, for example, the creation of internal markets, 
the separation of the purchase of services provision to facilitate competition among providers, 
the introduction for patients the possibility of choice between providers and insurers, or 
providing further information to users about the quality and prices of services. In general, the 
literature (e.g. Ennis, 2006, in the case of hospital services) indicates that a higher level of 
development of private coverage can generate competitive pressures that in turn generate 
cost reductions and quality improvements and incentives to innovate. However, it also 
emphasizes that the impact of competition may largely depend on how it is introduced, to 
which services it is applied, and, in general, what is the regulation of the entire health care 
                                                                          
17. On the other hand, civil servants in Spain are covered by MUFACE (a purpose-designed social security scheme for 
civil servants) and not by the NHS which covers all other workers. The co-payment of drugs for MUFACE civil servants is 
30%, while for NHS workers it is 40%. In the case of NHS retirees, the Czar, as indicated, exempt from co-payments 
while MUFACE retirees continue paying 30%. On the basis of the information available, Puig-Junoy (2007) shows that 
MUFACE employees spend 45% more per person per annum than NHS workers, and yet MUFACE retirees spend 49% 
less than NHS retirees, which would be indicative of the capacity of co-payment to reduce the health care bill. 
18. In particular, Moreno-Torres et al. (2010) analyse the effects of 16 regulatory policies in Catalonia between 1995 and 
2006, classifying the policies in five groups: (i) those aimed at reducing the margins of drug distributors and retailers; 
(ii) those based on lists of drugs excluded from receiving public funding; (iii) those in which the public authorities 
unilaterally impose a reduction on drug manufacturers’ maximum selling prices; (iv) those based on reference prices, i.e. 
when there are several drugs with the same characteristics and end-use and a reference price is set on the basis of the 
cheapest drug in the group, which will be the maximum amount that the public health system may reimburse for any 
drug in the group; (v) regulations whose purpose is to economically generic drugs. Given these five types of policies, the 
results in the paper indicate that, on one hand, 12 of the 16 regulations were not effective in reducing spending on 
drugs; and, on the other, of the four regulations that were effective in the short term, none had significant effects in the 
medium/long term. Sood et al. (2009) obtain the same result using different data and methodology. 
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system (OECD, 2006), so that its introduction under unsuitable conditions could generate not 
only a very low pressure on public spending but also in an increase in total health expenditure 
(López Casasnovas, 2006). 
Finally, other reforms have been aimed at modifying various organizational or 
coordination aspects of the health system by introducing greater decentralization, setting 
limits on budgets of personnel or medical equipment, modifying the mechanisms for defining 
the objectives and the assessment of their fulfilment, or reforming the gate keeping system. 
For instance, the target control indicator reflects how public health objectives are defined and 
the way in which their fulfilment is assessed. Thus, while some countries have developed 
target control in health policy to a high degree with bodies dedicated exclusively to this task 
(e.g. the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [NICE] in the United Kingdom), 
other countries such as Greece merely have general guidelines on health care priorities. Sabik 
et al. (2008) find that independent bodies for the control of targets like NICE have been 
successful in containing health care expenditure. Regarding control over access to 
consultants (i.e. gate keeping), it is argued that general practitioners can play a crucial role not 
only in terms of properly monitoring patients but also in controlling efficiently consultants’ 
review of patients, reducing patients’ search costs and controlling the demand for more 
specialised health care services (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). Brekke et al. (2007) find 
that when prices are regulated, gate keeping may reduce efficiency and social well-being 
because it generates and excessive specialisation in health care, meaning that the general 
practitioner becomes a receptionist who simply directs patients to the corresponding 
consultant without contributing any value to the health care chain. This hypothesis is 
confirmed empirically to some extent in Velasco et al. (2010) and Barros (1998), who find that 
larger degrees of gate keeping do not reduce health care costs.  
4.2 The impact of health care institutions on efficiency across OECD countries 
The cross-country comparison of health care policies and institutions is not exempt from 
difficulties given the existence of crucial country-specific characteristics in national health 
care systems. Fortunately, the OECD has made recently available a homogenised 
database that contains this information for 29 OECD countries. The information draws on 
a survey in which the health authorities of each country respond to 269 questions on 
their health care system19. Paris et al. (2010) then summarises the information in 20 
health care policy indicators that take values between 0 (minimum) and 6 (maximum). 
These indicators include information on the influence of the market and regulations on 
health care users, insurers and suppliers. They further summarise the characteristics of 
basic health care coverage, the management of the health-care budget and the 
decision-making process in the provision of health care systems. Specifically, OECD 
(2010) draws these 20 indicators together into four main groups of issues: (1) the health 
care system’s degree of dependency on market mechanisms; (2) intensity of regulation 
on the provision of health care; (3) degree of budgetary restriction on the health care 
system and (4) degree of decentralisation of decision-making.  
Table 2 offers a brief description of each of the 20 indicators and the respective 
values for Spain alongside the minimum and maximum observed value in the OECD 
countries. According to this information, the characteristics of the Spanish health care system 
may broadly be said to be similar to those of the other developed countries (see Chart 5). 
However, certain differentiated features of the Spanish system may be highlighted: (i) Spain 
                                                                          
19. More detailed information on the definition of the indicators and their construction can be found in Paris et al. (2010) 
and OECD (2010). 
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has a considerably greater degree of decentralisation than the other OECD countries owing to 
the fact that in Spain responsibility for health care expenditure is in the hands of the regional 
governments; (ii) the ability of Spanish users to choose their doctor is limited compared with 
other OECD countries; (iii) the degree of private health care provision20 is also limited 
compared with the OECD average; and (iv) in Spain there is a high degree of control over 
access to consultants, given the need to pass through a general practitioner, the professional 
who will decide whether to direct the patient to a consultant; (v) in Spain, health care 
personnel and materials are highly regulated, and incentives-based arrangements are 
relatively few21. 
In principle, given the definition of the foregoing indicators, most of the policies 
included in them might be expected to positively affect the efficiency of the health care 
system whereby, for example, greater competition in the provision of healthcare assistance 
might be expected to be accompanied by greater efficiency. However, for some of these 
indicators, the sign of the effect on the level of efficiency is not always clear a priori. 
Accordingly, to determine the sign and to quantify the impact on the efficiency of the various 
health care policies and institutions that these indicators proxy, an estimation is made of the 
following relationship between country levels of health care efficiency (described in the 
previous section) and the characteristics of the health care system defined by the 
20 indicators also in each country: 
 
where iEF  represents the level of efficiency (whether DEA or SFA) estimated for country i, 
ihIN is the indicator of policy k in country i, and h reflects the impact of policy h on the level 
of efficiency. 
Panel A in Table 3 includes the results of the estimate using as a measure of 
efficiency that derived from the DEA methodology. Specifically, a statistically significant effect 
is found for 5 indicators, namely price regulation, gate keeping, control of objectives, 
co-payment and the development of private coverage22. All these positively affect efficiency, 
with the exception of control over access to consultants, which evidences a negative 
coefficient. 
We repeat below the estimation of the impact of the 20 health care policy indicators 
compiled in OECD (2010) on efficiency, but using the SFA index instead of the DEA index as a 
proxy (see Panel B of Table 3). The policies that prove most important on considering the SFA 
index are the degree of universality (+), gate keeping (-), the degree of delegation to insurers 
(-) and price regulation23. Of these four policies, only gate keeping and price regulation also 
emerged as key policies for improving health care efficiency under the DEA approach shown. 
However, the degree of delegation to insurers and the degree of universality did not prove 
significant under the DEA index, which shows once again the sensitivity of the results to the 
                                                                          
20. Measured as the percentage of hospitals and doctors outside the public health system. 
21. For example, a payment system based on fixed wages to doctors is prevalent, which is less sensitive to demand 
compared with a payment system based on the number of patients attended.  
22. In IMF (2011) a similar exercise is performed, which finds that a high degree of decentralisation, central government 
control over budgetary ceilings, the possibility of patients choosing their insurance in basic coverage, the possibility of 
insurers competing and the degree of private provision all significantly affect efficiency.  
23. The sign with which each policy affects the level of SFA efficiency is in brackets. 
ih ihhi
VINEF   2010 
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efficiency measure used24. Regarding the magnitude of the coefficients, we must bear in mind 
that the dependent variable is different across panels so that estimates’ magnitudes are not 
directly comparable. 
Given the estimated elasticities of each regulation indicator (see last column of 
Table 3) and also taking into account Spain’s relative position in respect of the OECD 
countries in each of these policies (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 3), one can estimate the 
potential gain entailed, in terms of efficiency, were Spain to situate its health care policy at 
the maximum OECD level. For instance, according to DEA estimates there would be room 
for efficiency gains based on increases in the level of price signals on users. This is so due 
to the high elasticity25 associated to this indicator26 and the relatively low level of the 
indicator for Spain. 
4.3 Robustness analysis 
It should be stressed that the analysis conducted in the previous section is based on 
regressions in which we estimate 21 parameters (the constant plus the elasticities of each of 
the 20 policy indicators) drawing on only 29 observations (one for each country in the 
sample). Accordingly, the resulting t-ratios may give rise to mistaken conclusions given the 
scantiness of degrees of freedom. In situations in which the number of observations is on a 
similar scale to the number of variables, it has been shown that it is usual to select variables 
that are completely independent from the variable of interest as highly significant 
(e.g. Freedman, 1983). 
An alternative methodology that is suitable for resolving the aforementioned problem 
of scant degrees of liberty is that of Bayesian model averaging. Given that we have 
20 variables (the 20 indicators of health care institutions and policies) that are candidates for 
explaining the efficiency index, we can estimate 220=1,048,576 different models, one for each 
possible combination of variables. Estimating all these models, the Bayesian averaging 
methodology allows us to calculate, among other things, the relative contributions of each 
variable to explaining the volatility of our efficiency index. In this way, those variables that 
explain a bigger percentage of the variance of the efficiency index can be labelled as robust 
determinants of health care efficiency. 
Formally, the starting point is the estimation by OLS of all the models resulting from 
the possible combinations of the 20 explanatory variables we have. We refer to each of these 
models as iM , with 
202,...,1i . From a Bayesian standpoint we can estimate the 
posterior probability of each model: 
                                                                          
24. The degree of delegation to insurers refers to the involvement of insurers in decision-making relating to the health 
care system. For example, in career, which scores a maximum level in this indicator, insurers decide are on the means of 
payment to doctors and hospitals, they finance and maintain health care infrastructure is and they decide are on social 
contributions to the health care system.  Moreover, the degree of universe other team refers to the proportion of the 
population covered by some type of medical insurers. All the countries in our sample, with the exception of Turkey, have 
values between 5 and 6 in this indicator.  
25. The IMF (see IMF, 2010) also identifies the expansion of private coverage and cost sharing between supplier and 
user as effective policies in health care cost containment. The IMF uses a different measure of efficiency than the one 
used in this document. More specifically, the IMF uses the "excess cost growth", i.e., the increase in health spending per 
capita that is not explained by the increase in GDP per capita and demographic change. On the other hand, the IMF's 
conclusions are based on the magnitude of the elasticities and not their statistical significance. 
26. Note that the indicator of co-payment (or price signals on users) is based on the percentage of health spending 
through direct payment over total health expenditure in each country (see Table 2). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1107 
 
 
where )( iMP  is the prior probability of each model set by the researcher, N  is the 
number of observations, ik  is the number of parameters to be estimated in model i  and 
iSSE  is the sum of the squared errors of model i . Furthermore, )|( yMP i  is the 
posterior probability of model i , i.e. a type of measure of goodness of fit from a Bayesian 
standpoint (note that y  refers to the data, i.e. we have the prior probability )( iMP , before 
seeing the data, and the posterior probability
 
)|( yMP i , after seeing the data).  
Once we have the posterior probability of each model, we can calculate the 
probability of inclusion (a posteriori) of each variable, i.e. the probability that the coefficient 
accompanying the variable is other than zero. This probability will be given by the sum of the 
probabilities of all the models in which the variable in question is included. Specifically, the 
probability of variable h  being included in the model will be: 
 
 
Those variables with higher posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP) will be those that 
most contribute to explaining the volatility of the efficiency index and will, therefore, 
be considered as robust determinants of the level of efficiency. Specifically, we can consider 
as robust those variables whose PIP is greater than 0.5. This is so because we will assume 
a priori that each model is equally probable a priori ( iMP i  2021)( ), meaning that the 
prior inclusion probability is 0.5 for all the variables. As a result, the variables with PIP>0.5 will 
be considered robust because the data favour their inclusion in the model or, otherwise 
expressed, they are those which most contribute to explaining the variation of the dependent 
variable. Interested readers can consult Hoeting et al. (1999) or Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) for 
further details. 
Table 4 shows the PIP obtained for each of the indicators considering both efficiency 
indices separately as a dependent variable. We can see that all the indicators that proved 
significant in the simple regression presented in table 3 may be considered robust under the 
criteria set using Bayesian model averaging techniques, i.e. they have inclusion probabilities of 
over 0.5. We can therefore conclude that the results obtained in this section may be 
considered robust despite the problem of few degrees of freedom in the estimates. 
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5 Conclusions 
Containing health care expenditure is one of the biggest challenges facing public 
policy-makers in the developed countries. Although inevitable population ageing will be an 
important factor in how future health care expenditure develops, it is not the only relevant 
factor. Indeed, according to the projections analysed in this paper, other supply-side and 
non-demographic factors might even be more important than the purely demographic factor. 
Improving health care system management efficiency may be an alternative to be 
taken into account in containing health care expenditure. Although the results depend on the 
indices considered, this paper provides conclusive evidence that there are significant 
differences across countries in health care management efficiency levels. Accordingly, 
potential efficiency gains in this sector, and therefore savings in economic terms, are high for 
many developed countries. 
Furthermore, there is a significant relationship between various health care policies 
and institutions and the levels of efficiency of health care systems. However, the levels of 
efficiency estimated for the different countries, and as a consequence of the role of regulatory 
policies in their improvement, are significantly affected by the methodology used. 
Finally, it is also worth highlighting that both health production and efficiency in health 
system management crucially depend on a variety of factors unrelated to the health system 
that cannot be observed at the aggregate level (Garber and Skinner, 2008). Therefore, results 
from aggregate exercises such as the one presented here must be interpreted with caution 
and, ideally, be complemented with exercises at the micro level (López-Casasnovas, 2005). In 
any event, the findings of this paper are broadly compatible with other available evidence, in 
particular that drawn from microeconomic data. 
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SOURCE: EC (2009), Oliveira et al. (2006) and IMF (2010). 
 
Agency EC OECD IMF
Period 2007-2060 2005-2050 2010-2050
Country Europen Union OECD Developed
Central scenario 1,5 pp. - 3.0 pp.
Confidence interval 0.7 - 2.4 pp. 2.0 - 3.9 pp. 2.1 - 4.1 pp.
Central scenario (Spain) 1.6 pp. - 1.6 pp.
Confidence interval (Spain) 1.0 - 2.6 pp. 2.3 - 4.1 pp. 0.8 - 2.4 pp.
Table 1: Projections of the increase in health care expenditure as a % of GDP
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SOURCE: OECD (2010). 
Indicator Description of the content of the indicator Spain OECD 
minimum
OECD 
maximum
Choice of insurer
Type of coverage (at national or local level and with a single or several insurers). In the event of several
insurers, their number, their market shares and the ability of the population to choose between them.
1 0 6
Insurer level for 
competition
Ability of the insurers to regulate their profits, to decide on coverage and to design contracts with
suppliers. Existence of a risk compensation system. Availability of information for consumers on
premiums and coverage, and on the insurers’ performance. 0 0 5
Over the basic coverage
Percentage of population with private coverage additional to basic cover (duplicated, supplementary),
percentage of health care expenditure funded by private medical insurance and degree of market
concentration. 3 0 6
Degree of private 
provision
Breakdown of doctors and hospital services based on public or private status.
0.5 0.3 4.7
Volume incentives
Means of payment to doctors and hospitals based on the incentives they give to generate health care
assistance. For example, payment of fixed wages to doctors versus variable wages on the basis of
patients attended to. 
1.2 1.1 5.7
Regulation of prices billed 
by providers
Regulation of drug prices and the prices billed by doctors and hospitals.
5.3 2 5.9
User information on 
quality and prices
Information available to users on the quality and prices of different health care services.
0 0 5.3
Regulation of the 
workforce and equipment
Quotas for the total number of Medicine students and by speciality, regulation of placements for
practice, policies to tackle shortages, regulation of high technology hospital equipment and activities
(number of hospitals and beds, specific services, high‐cost medical teams) and control of the hiring and
remuneration of hospital staff. 4.5 0.8 5.3
Patient choice among 
providers
Degree of freedom in choice of doctors and hospitals.
0.7 0 6
Gate keeping Obligations or incentives to consult a general practitioner before seeing a  consultant. 6 0 6
Price signals on users
Degree to which patients defray a portion of health care expenses through direct payment. This
specifically measures the percentage of health care expenditure made through direct payment.
1.3 0.3 3.1
Priority setting
Definition of health care services to be provided, criteria taken into account in this definition, the
effective use of assessments of health care technology, the definition and monitoring of public health
objectives. 2.8 0.8 5.7
Stringency of the budget 
constraint
Rules and/or objectives for setting the health care budget and its allocation through sub‐sectors and/or
regions. 2 0 6
Regulation of prices paid 
by third‐party payers
Regulation of prices paid by taxpayers for general practitioners, consultants, hospital services and
medicine. 4.5 3.2 5.9
Degree of decentralization Number of main decisions adopted at the level of sub‐national governments. 5.5 0 5.5
Degree of delegation to 
insurers
Number of important decisions taken by insurers.
0 0 3.5
Consistency in 
responsability
Number of decisions that are within the remit of more than one government (national, regional, local)
and consistency in the apportionment of responsibilities.  6 1.3 6
Breadth Proportion of the population covered by basic medical insurance.  6 4 6
Scope of basic coverage Range of health care products and services covered by basic medical insurance. 5.6 4.7 6
Depth of coverage Expenses covered by the goods and services included in the basic‐provision package, real level of
coverage of basic medical insurance and extra payments necessary for basic primary attention.   5.4 4.1 5.7
Table 2: Summary of indicators on health care system characteristics
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
a. Obtained from the regression of the DEA efficiency level on 20 health care policy indicators considered by the 
OECD. All the indicators vary between 0 (minimum level) and 6 (maximum level). 
b. Obtained from the regression of the DEA efficiency level on 20 health care policy indicators considered by the 
OECD. All the indicators vary between 0 (minimum level) and 6 (maximum level). 
Policy indicator Level for Spain Maximum OECD Elasticity policy-
efficiency (a)
Regulation of prices billed by providers 5.3 5.9 0.011
Gate keeping 6 6 -0.005
Priority setting 2.8 5.7 0.009
Price signals on users 1.3 3.1 0.02
Over the basic coverage 3 6 0.003
Policy indicator Level for Spain Maximum OECD Elasticity policy-
efficiency (b)
Breadth 6 6 0.413
Gate keeping 6 6 -0.073
Degree of delegation to insurers 0 3.5 -0.162
Regulation of prices billed by providers 5.3 5.9 0.116
Table 3: Impact of health care regulation on efficiency
Panel A: DEA Efficiency index as dependent variable
Panel B: SFA Efficiency index as dependent variable
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
PIP refers to the Posterior Inclusion Probability of each variable. See main text for more details. 
Policy indicator PIP Policy indicator PIP
Regulation of prices billed by 
providers
1.00 Breadth 0.99
Priority setting 1.00 Regulation of prices billed by 
providers
0.92
Gate keeping 1.00 Degree of delegation to 
insurers
0.90
Price signals on users 1.00 Gate keeping 0.88
Over the basic coverage 0.99 Volume incentives 0.80
Regulation of the workforce 
and equipment
0.93 Regulation of the workforce 
and equipment
0.67
Insurer level for competition 0.80 Regulation of prices paid by 
third-party payers
0.64
Degree of delegation to 
insurers
0.71 Priority setting 0.52
Choice of insurer 0.31 Patient choice among 
providers
0.43
Scope of basic coverage 0.28 Stringency of the budget 
constraint
0.39
User information on quality 
and prices
0.27 Insurer level for competition 0.36
Patient choice among 
providers
0.22 Choice of insurer 0.34
Degree of private provision 0.21 Depth of coverage 0.34
Breadth 0.21 Price signals on users 0.30
Depth of coverage 0.21 Scope of basic coverage 0.30
Degree of decentralization 0.21 Over the basic coverage 0.27
Stringency of the budget 
constraint
0.20 Degree of private provision 0.26
Volume incentives 0.18 Degree of decentralization 0.25
Consistency in responsability 0.18 User information on quality 
and prices
0.24
Regulation of prices paid by 
third-party payers
0.18 Consistency in responsability 0.21
Table 4: Impact of health care regulation on efficiency                     
using Bayesian model averaging
DEA Efficiency index                    
as dependent variable
SFA Efficiency index                    
as dependent variable
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SOURCE: EC (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
NOTE: This chart shows the growth of per capita health care expenditure in various OECD countries between 1980 and 2008, 
and the contribution of the foregoing factors to this growth, under the assumption that both the demographic factor and that 
relating to per capita income have unit elasticity. The demographic factor is proxied by the difference between per capita health 
care expenditure with the 1980 population age structure and per capita health expenditure under the 2008 age structure (see 
main text for further details). 
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Chart 2. Breakdown of health care expenditure: 1980-2008
Demographic  factor GDP per capita Residual
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SOURCE: OECD (2010) and authors’ calculations. 
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Chart 3: Efficiency indices by country 
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SOURCE: OECD (2010) and authors’ calculations. 
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Chart 4: Potential saving in health care expenditure as a % of 
GDP  should the maximum level of efficiency be reached % of GDP
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SOURCE: OECD (2010) and authors’ calculations. 
NOTE: Each of the indicators has values between 0 and 6, with 6 indicating that the policy is highly used. 
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Chart 5: Indicators of Health Care Policies and Institutions 
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Data Appendix 
Variable Source Years 
DEA index of health care efficiency OCDE (2010) 2007 
SFA index of health care efficiency Authors’ calculations 2007 
Health care policies and institutions 
Paris et al. (2010) and 
OCDE (2010) 
2009 
Life expectancy (years) OECD Health Data 2010 1980-2009 
Per capita GDP (USD PPP) OECD Health Data 2010 1980-2009 
Per capita health expenditure (USD PPP) OECD Health Data 2010 1980-2009 
Secondary education (as a share of 
population) 
OECD Health Data 2010 1997-2009 
Tobacco consumption (in grames per capita) OECD Health Data 2010 1997-2009 
Alcohol consumption (in litres per capita) OECD Health Data 2010 1997-2009 
Fruit and vegetables consumption (in kg per 
capita) 
OECD Health Data 2010 1997-2009 
Nitrogen oxide emissions (in kg per capita) OECD Health Data 2010 1997-2009 
 
NOTE: All variables are available for all the 29 OECD countries appearing in Chart 3. 
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